세무와회계저널 | Strategic Thinking in Tax Reporting
첨부파일
-
08_김정권(229~256)_영문.pdf
(484.8K)
16회 다운로드
DATE : 2011-07-21 16:25:42
관련링크
본문
| 발행일 : 2011년 6월 일 |
| 제 12권 2호 |
| 저자 : Chung Kweon Kim |
Behavioral game theory experimentally investigates strategic interaction by combining insights from game-theoretic models and models of human information processing. Given limited rationality, what level of strategic thinking do individuals achieve in a tax reporting game? The experiment in this study reveals that tax auditors and firms adjust their strategy based on a belief about the opponent’s response to parametric change, but do not correctly recognize that the opponent does likewise, indicating that tax auditor’s strategic decision is biased by normatively irrelevant information.

